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A Proof of Proposition 8
In order to prove Proposition 8, I state and prove a series of Claims. Note that Claims 1-3 do
not rely on the assumptions A1 or A1′. The first claim below implies that future rewards are not
used in the optimal hybrid contract, and hence, default takes place through refusing to pay the
bonus.
CLAIM 1: In the optimal hybrid equilibrium, ut = u¯1−δ at every t ≥ 0. Thus, only bonus
payments are used to discipline the agent.
PROOF: Let {wt , bt}∞t=0 denote the set of contracts in the optimal hybrid equilibrium, and let
et denote the effort implemented at t (note that {wt , bt} is offered and accepted provided that
the principal has not defaulted at any τ < t). Obviously, u0 = u¯1−δ must hold, otherwise w0
can be reduced by a small amount and make both types better off. Next, suppose towards a
contradiction that ut+1 > u¯1−δ at some t ≥ 0. Note that either (i) bt > δlpil,t+1 − δlpidl,t+1; or
(ii) bt ≤ δlpil,t+1 − δlpidl,t+1, where pil,t+1 represents the payoff of a low type principal who
has never defaulted until t + 1 (by an abuse of notation), and pidθ,t+1 represents the punishment
payoff of a type-θ principal who defaulted at t . If (i) holds, then ut+1 > u¯1−δ cannot be optimal
for any t ≥ 0. The reason is as follows. In this case, the low type strictly prefers defaulting
at t . Consider the modified hybrid contract: bt is increased by a small amount δε > 0, and
wt+1 is reduced by ε; thus, ut+1 reduces by ε whereas pih,t+1 and pil,t+1 both increase by ε.
The bonus reward bt + δε is still contingent on et as in the original contract, and everything
else remains the same. This modified hybrid contract strictly increases the payoff of the high
type, whereas the low type principal and the agent are unaffected. To see why, first note that
the agent’s participation constraint is still satisfied at every t (since ε is small enough), and
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the agent’s incentive-compatibility constraint for choosing effort level et is satisfied at every t
by construction as long as that the increased bonus payment is enforceable with the high type
principal. But this is indeed the case since pih,t+1 increases by ε, and
bt + δhpidh,t+1 ≤ δhpih,t+1
together with δh > δ implies that
bt + δε + δhpidh,t+1 < δh(pih,t+1 + ε).
Thus, bt + δε is enforceable with the high type principle. With ε sufficiently small, bt + δε +
pidl,t+1 > δl(pi
i
l,t+1 + ε) also holds. Thus, the low type still strictly prefers defaulting on the
bonus promise at t , and therefore, there is no change in the low type’s imitation payoff. But
the high type’s payoff increases by δt−1h (δh − δ)ε > 0 in the modified separating contract, a
contradiction.
Next, consider the case in which (ii) holds, and suppose towards a contradiction that
ut+1 > u¯1−δ for some t ≥ 0. First, consider the case where bt ≥ 0. Consider the modified
contract: bt is increased by a small amount δlε, bt + δlε implements et as before, and wt+1
is reduced by ε, which reduces ut+1 by ε and increases pih,t+1 and pil,t+1 by ε—everything
else remains the same. As I explain below, the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility
constraints are unaffected; therefore, this change strictly increases the payoff of the high type
whereas the low type’s payoff is unaffected. To see why, note that
bt + δlε ≤ δl(pil,t+1 + ε)− δlpidl,t+1
holds. In particular, the low type’s strategy is exactly the same as before by construction. This
is also true for the high type. Thus, the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints still hold, and the high type’s payoff increases by
[
δth(δh − δl)
]
ε > 0, whereas the low
type’s payoff is the same as before, a contradiction. The argument is similar if bt < 0—this
time, the agent’s enforcement constraint matters. Hence, ut = u¯1−δ must hold in the optimal
contract for every t ≥ 0.
By Claim 1, default takes place only through refusing to pay the bonus, and thus, beliefs
are updated only after the total payment Pt is observed and µ1t+1 = µ2t for every t . Therefore, I
focus on µt ≡ µ1t for t ≥ 1, where µt denotes the posterior belief of the sender at the beginning
of t ≥ 1, and µ0 denotes the prior belief at t = 0, as before.
CLAIM 2: If the optimal contract is hybrid, then there exists a T <∞ such that the high type
principal starts offering Ch from T onwards.
PROOF: Let {wt , bt}∞t=0 denote the optimal hybrid set of contracts, and let et denote the effort
implemented at t . To prove the claim, first I show that there exists a T˜ < ∞ such that the low
type strictly prefers defaulting at period T˜ . To see why, assume towards a contradiction that
this is not the case. But this would mean that {wt , bt}∞t=0 is an equilibrium set of contracts that
can be implemented with the low type in a symmetric-information setting without default, and
thus, either {wt , bt}∞t=0 is such that {wt , bt} = Cl and el is implemented at every t—this is a
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contradiction—or the imitation payoff of the low type from {wt , bt}∞t=0 is strictly lower than
sl−u¯
1−δl . This latter is also a contradiction because then either (i) the high type’s payoff from this
hybrid contract is lower than sl−u¯1−δh , and hence, a separating equilibrium is strictly better, or (ii)
the high type’s payoff from the hybrid contract is higher than sl−u¯1−δh , in which case it is possible
to construct a separating contract in a way that the low type is strictly better off and the high
type is indifferent. The construction is as follows. The high type offers the set of contracts
{wt , bt}∞t=0 and implements et at every t ≥ 0 exactly as in the original contract, whereas the
low type offers Cl . This is indeed a separating equilibrium since the imitation payoff of the
low type is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl , and thus, the low type has no incentive to imitate. But
this separating equilibrium generates a strictly higher payoff than the hybrid equilibrium, a
contradiction. Hence, if the optimal contract is hybrid, then there exists a T˜ <∞ such that the
low type strictly prefers defaulting at T˜ . Given this, there must exist a finite T such that the
high type starts offering Ch from T onwards. The proof for this is similar to the argument in
Lemma 5, and therefore omitted.
For the following claims, let λt denote the equilibrium probability with which bt is
honored assuming that past bonus payments have been honored. The high type honors the
bonus payment at every t ≥ 0 in the optimal hybrid contract, whereas the low type may default.
Thus,
λt = µt + (1− µt)νt ,
where νt denotes the equilibrium probability with which the low type principal honors bt .
CLAIM 3: If the optimal hybrid contract is such that ν0 > 0 and the low type obtains an
equilibrium payoff that is weakly lower than sl−u¯1−δl , then it is strictly dominated by a separating
contract. If the optimal contract is hybrid, then the equilibrium payoff of the low type is weakly
greater than sl−u¯1−δl .
PROOF: Let {wt , bt}∞t=0 denote the optimal hybrid set of contracts, and let et denote the effort
implemented by the contract at t . Suppose that ν0 > 0 and that the low type’s payoff is weakly
lower than sl−u¯1−δl given this set of contracts. I will modify this contract to generate a separating
contract that makes the high type strictly better off and the low type weakly better off. I assume
that the high type’s payoff from the optimal hybrid equilibrium is weakly greater than sl−u¯1−δh ;
otherwise, the optimal hybrid contract is even worse than the optimal pooling contract. The
separating contract of the high type is as follows. At t = 0, let
w′0 = w0 +
T∑
t=0
δtl (1− λt)bt ,
where T > 0 is the first period such that νT = 0 (T > 0 since ν0 > 0 by hypothesis), b′t = λtbt
for t ≥ 0, and everything else is exactly the same as in the original hybrid contract for every
t ≥ 0. Note that it is without loss to assume that T < ∞ since the proof of Claim 2 indicates
that a hybrid equilibrium with T = ∞ is strictly dominated. The low type, however, always
offers Cl . This is a separating equilibrium since the imitation payoff of the low type cannot
exceed sl−u¯1−δl by construction. Moreover, the high type is strictly better off in this equilibrium
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because δh > δl and λT < 1. Hence, the first statement is proved. Given the first statement, I
need to prove the second statement only in the case where ν0 = 0. In that case, information is
fully revealed by the end of t = 0. Suppose towards a contradiction that the low type’s payoff
is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl . Then, I modify the optimal hybrid contract to generate a separating
contract for the high type as follows. At t = 0, w′0 = w0+(1−µ0)b0−ε, and b′0 = µ0b0 where
ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, and everything else is the same for the high type as in the original
contract. The low type offers Cl in the separating contract. The low type strictly prefers doing
so with sufficiently small ε > 0. Thus, both types are strictly better off, a contradiction.
From now on, I will assume that either A1 or A1′ holds. In the final claim of the proof
(Claim 6), I will show that if y′(eh)/c′(eh) is sufficiently larger than 1, then imposing the worst
punishment is optimal, as stated in A1′. I will also show that a similar result obtains if δl and δh
are not far from each other or if µ0 is sufficiently high.
CLAIM 4: Consider the optimal hybrid equilibrium. If λtbt < bl (λtbt ≤ bl) at some t ≥ 0
such that νt < 1 (and ντ > 0 for every τ < t if t > 0), then the equilibrium payoff of the low
type is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl (at most
sl−u¯
1−δl ).
PROOF: For t = 0, the statement is obvious due to Claim 1. Suppose that λtbt < bl at some
t > 0 such that νt < 1 and ντ > 0 for every τ < t . Since λtbt < bl , it follows that bτ < bl for
all τ < t . To prove this, I will start by showing that bt−1 < bl . Since νt−1 > 0 and νt < 1 by
hypothesis,
bt−1 ≤ δlpil,t − δl1− δl p¯i = δl
(
s(e(λt , bt))− u¯)+ λtbt + δl1− δl p¯i
)
− δl
1− δl p¯i
< δl
sl − u¯ − p¯i
1− δl = bl .
where pil,t represents the payoff of a low type principal who has not defaulted until t as described
in Claim 1, and e(λ, b) denotes the effort level implemented in the optimal contract given that b
is honored with probability λ and a future reward is not used because λtbt = c(e(λt , bt)) for all
t ≥ 0 in the optimal hybrid contract.1 The second inequality above follows because λtbt < bl ,
and thus,
pil,t = s(e(λt , bt))− u¯)+ λtbt + δl1− δl p¯i <
sl − u¯
1− δl
must hold. As a result, bt−1 < bl . Next, I assume that bk < bl for all k ∈ {τ, τ + 1, ..., t − 1}
by the induction hypothesis and show that bτ−1 < bl . Since ντ−1 > 0,
bτ−1 ≤ δlpil,τ − δl1− δl p¯i.
1If it were the case that λt bt> c(et ) at some t > 0 in the optimal hybrid contract, then et and wt could
be increased to e′t and w′t , respectively, such that c(e′t ) = λt bt , and w′t = wt+s(e′t )− s(et ). As a result,
u1> u¯1−δ , and e0, the equilibrium effort at t = 0, could be increased by a small amount because u1> u¯1−δ .
Thus, the equilibrium strategy of the low type is unaffected, and both principal types are better off, a
contradiction. Of course, λ0b0> c(e0) cannot hold in the optimal contract since e0 < eh . Therefore, in the
optimal contract, λt bt= c(et ) for all t .
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But pil,τ < sl−u¯1−δl because (i) pil,t <
sl−u¯
1−δl as argued above, and (ii) bk < bl and λkbk = c(ek)
imply that sk < sl for all k ∈ {τ, τ + 1, ..., t − 1}. As a result, bτ−1 < δl sl−u¯−p¯i1−δl = bl . Thus,
bτ < bl and sτ < sl for all τ < t . Given these and given that pil,t < sl−u¯1−δl , the equilibrium payoff
of the low type is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl . The proof for the case stated inside the parentheses
is very similar and therefore, omitted.
In what follows, let tk index periods such that the posterior belief is updated from tk to
tk + 1; that is, νtk < 1, νt > 0 for all t < tk , and µtk 6= µtk+1. In particular, t0 = min{t ≥
0|µ0 6= µt+1}, and tk = min{t > tk−1|µt+1 6= µt} provided that νtk−1 > 0.
CLAIM 5: If the optimal hybrid contract weakly dominates the optimal separating contract,
then (i) bt < λtk btk at every t < tk , and (ii) bl ≤ λt0bt0 .
PROOF: I start with part (i). If v0 = 0, then t0 = 0 and there is nothing to prove, so assume
that v0 > 0. Take an arbitrary tk > 0, and suppose towards a contradiction that btk−1 ≥ λtk btk .
By the definition of tk , νtk < 1 and νt > 0 for all t < tk . Thus,
λtk btk ≤ btk−1 ≤ δl
(
s(e(λtk , btk ))− u¯)+ λtk btk +
δl
1− δl p¯i
)
− δl
1− δl p¯i.
But this implies that λtk btk ≤ bl . By Claim 4, the payoff of the low type is at most sl−u¯1−δl .
But this is a contradiction given the initial hypothesis and Claim 3 because v0 > 0. Hence,
btk−1 < λtk btk must hold. Next, assume that bt < λtk btk holds for all t ∈ {τ, τ + 1, . . . , tk − 1}
by the induction hypothesis. I now show that bτ−1 < λtk btk also holds. Again, by the definition
of tk , ντ−1 > 0. Thus,
bτ−1 ≤ δl
( tk∑
i=τ
δi−τl (s(e(λi , bi ))− u¯)+ δtk−τl λtk btk +
δl
1− δl p¯i
)
− δl
1− δl p¯i.
I will now show that
tk∑
i=τ
δi−τl (s(e(λi , bi ))− u¯)+ δtk−τl λtk btk +
δl
1− δl p¯i < s(e(λtk , btk ))− u¯+λtk btk +
δl
1− δl p¯i. (1)
To see why this holds, first note that
(max
i
s(e(λi , bi ))− u¯)
tk∑
i=τ
δi−τl ≥
tk∑
i=τ
δi−τl (s(e(λi , bi ))− u¯),
and that s(e(λtk , btk )) = maxi s(e(λi , bi )) because λtbt = c(e(λt , bt)) and by the induction
hypothesis bt < λtk btk for all t ∈ {τ, τ + 1, . . . , tk − 1}. Therefore, it is enough to show that
(s(e(λtk , btk ))− u¯)
tk−τ−1∑
i=0
δil < (1− δtk−τl )
(
s(e(λtk , btk ))− u¯ + λtk btk +
δl
1− δl p¯i
)
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in order to prove that (1) holds. Note that λtk btk > bl by Claims 3 and 4 and by the initial
hypothesis that the optimal contract is hybrid. As a result, the right-hand side of the inequality
above is strictly greater than
(1− δtk−τl )
s(e(λtk , btk ))− u¯
1− δl .
Moreover,
∑tk−τ−1
i=0 δ
i
l = 1−δ
tk−τ
l
1−δl . Thus, (1) holds. From (1), it follows that bτ−1 < λtk btk
must hold. Otherwise, the implication is that λtk btk < bl , but this is a contradiction by Claims
3 and 4. Finally, I show that part (ii) holds. Suppose not. Then, bl > λt0bt0 . Again, this is a
contradiction by Claims 3 and 4. 
Now, assume that the optimal hybrid contract weakly dominates separating equilibria
and that νt0 > 0. Then, Claim 5 implies that btk−1 < λtk btk for every tk ≥ 0 such that k > 0. Let
K be such that νtK = 0. Thus,
bl ≤ λt0bt0 <
∏K
k=0 λtk btK ≤ bh
∏K
k=0 λtk = µ0bh
since btK ≤ bh and
∏K
k=0 λtk = µ0. As a result, µ0 > blbh must hold. Otherwise, the contract
is strictly dominated by a separating equilibrium. The condition µ0 > blbh must also hold if
the optimal contract is hybrid, and νt0 = 0. There are two cases to consider: (i) t0 > 0 and
(ii) t0 = 0. First, note that in either case µ0 ≥ blbh since bl ≤ λt0bt0 = µ0bt0 ≤ µ0bh from
Claim 5. If t0 > 0, then µ0 = blbh cannot hold due to Claims 3 and 4. Next, suppose towards a
contradiction that the optimal contract is hybrid but µ0 = blbh and t0 = 0. By Claim 5, the only
possibility is that b0 = bh . While this gives the low type a payoff of sl−u¯1−δl , it can be checked that
the high type obtains a payoff strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δh , a contradiction. Hence, I showed that
the optimal hybrid contract is strictly dominated if µ0 ≤ blbh .
I now show that there exists an ε > 0 such that the optimal hybrid contract is strictly
dominated for µ0 ∈
(
bl
bh
, blbh + ε
)
. This is because the optimal hybrid contract is strictly dom-
inated if µ0 = blbh , and the payoff of the optimal hybrid equilibrium is continuous in µ0, as I
will now show (the payoff of the optimal separating equilibrium does not depend on µ0). Take
an arbitrary µ0 and an arbitrary sequence {µn0} such that limn→∞ µn0 = µ0. Let pi and pin
denote the payoff of the optimal hybrid contract with µ0 and µn0 , respectively. I will show that
pin converges to pi as µn0 converges to µ0. First, I will first show that limn→∞ pin ≥ pi . To
show this, I will construct a hybrid equilibrium with µn0 and large n, as follows. Let t0 ≥ 0
denote the first period in which the low type defaults with positive probability in the optimal
hybrid contract with µ0. Since νt0 < 1, it follows that λt0 ∈ (0, 1). The hybrid contract
that I will construct given µn0 is exactly the same as the optimal hybrid contract with µ0, in
terms of the implemented effort level, the fixed wage, the bonus payment, and the default rate
by the low type, with the following exception at period t0. Take sufficiently large n, and let
νnt0 = νt0
µn0
1−µn0
1−µ0
µ0
and λnt0 = µn0 + (1 − µn0)νnt0 in the hybrid contract with µn0 . Also, let the
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effort level implemented at t0 be such that c(ent0) = λnt0bt0 , where bt0 is the bonus in the original
hybrid contract with µ0 at period t0. Note that νnt0 < 1 with all sufficiently large n. Moreover,
as µn0 goes to µ0, ν
n
t0 goes to νt0 and λ
n
t0bt0 goes to λt0bt0 . The posterior at t0 + 1 is identical in
the two contracts with µ0 and µn0 by construction, and everything else (in particular, the imple-
mented effort level, the fixed wage, the bonus payment, the default rate by the low type) after
period t0 and prior to t0 is the same. As a result, the payoff of this construction converges to
pi as µn0 converges to µ0. It follows that limn→∞ pin ≥ pi must hold. Next, I will show that
limn→∞ pin = pi . Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a sequence {µn0} such that
limn→∞ µn0 = µ0 and limn→∞ pin > pi . Let ε = limn→∞ pin − pi . This time, I will construct
a hybrid contract with µ0 given the optimal hybrid contract with µn0 . Take a sufficiently large n
and set νt0 = νnt0 µ01−µ0
1−µn0
µn0
< 1, λt0 = µ0 + (1 − µ0)νt0 and c(et0) = λt0bt0 where, this time,
t0 ≥ 0 denotes the first period in which the low type defaults with positive probability in the
optimal hybrid contract with µn0 , and bt0 is the bonus in the hybrid contract with µ
n
0 . Similar to
the construction above, the posterior at t0 + 1 is identical in the two contracts with µ0 and µn0
by construction, and everything else after period t0 and prior to t0 is the same. As a result, the
payoff of this construction differs from pin by only (γ δt0h + (1− γ )δt0l )
(
s(ent0)− s(et0)
)
, which
is strictly smaller than ε if n is large enough because y and s are continuous, and λnt0 and λt0
are arbitrarily close by construction with large enough n. Thus, limn→∞ pin > pi cannot hold.
Hence, the proof is complete, and the very first claim in part (i) of Proposition 8 follows: There
exists an ε > 0 such that the optimal hybrid contract is strictly dominated if µ0 ≤ blbh + ε. For
the following claim, consider µ0 such that µ0 > 1 −  for small  > 0. I construct a hybrid
equilibrium such that at t = 0 the fixed wage is wh , and the bonus reward is bh contingent on
effort level e0, where c(e0) = µ0bh . If the bonus payment is honored at t = 0, then the contract
offer is Ch from t ≥ 1 onwards. The low type will default at t = 0, while the high type will
always honor the contract at every t ≥ 0. For sufficiently small  > 0, the payoff of the high
type and low type approximate sh−u¯1−δh and sh − u¯ + bh + δl p¯i1−δl , respectively. But the separating
equilibrium payoff for the high type is bounded above away from sh−u¯1−δh due to a fixed cost of
signaling which is independent of µ0, while the low type’s payoff is only sl−u¯1−δl . Thus, if µ0 is
sufficiently high and close to one, then the optimal contract is hybrid.
Next, I show that given γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique µγ such that µγ > blbh and
the optimal contract is separating if µ0 ≤ µγ and hybrid otherwise. First, I show why a single
cutoff exists. This is because, while the prior belief µ0 does not affect the payoff of the optimal
separating contract for fixed γ , the payoff of the optimal hybrid contract strictly increases in
µ0. To see why, let µ′0 > µ0. I will now modify the optimal contract with µ0 and generate
a hybrid contract with µ′0 that gives a strictly higher payoff for both types. Let tk index the
periods in which the low type defaults with strictly positive probability in the optimal hybrid
equilibrium with µ0; that is, νtk < 1 and µtk 6= µtk+1. Since µ′0 > µ0, there exists a tK such
that µtK < µ
′
0 ≤ µtK+1 (note that µt0 = µ0 by the definition of tk). Then, the default rate
of the low type in the modified contract with µ′0 is zero at every t < tK , and the implemented
effort levels are compatible with this, that is, ν′t = 1 and c(e′t) = bt at every t < tK , where
bt represents the bonus at period t in the original hybrid contract with µ0. Everything else is
the same as in the original contract until tK . In period tK , ν′tK is such that ν
′
tK = νtK
µ′0
1−µ′0
1−µtK
µtK
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holds. This construction ensures that the posterior at tK + 1 is the same in both contracts; that
is, µtK+1 = µ′tK+1. Moreover, ν′tK ≥ νtK , λ′tK > λtK and also, c(e′tK ) = λ′tK btK ; thus, a strictly
higher effort level is implemented at tK in the modified contract. The rest of the modified
contract is identical to the original contract. The modified contract with prior µ′0 generates
a strictly higher payoff than the optimal hybrid contract with µ0 for both types since (i) the
implemented effort in the contract with µ′0 is weakly higher in every period and strictly higher
in, at least, one period until period tK + 1 at no additional cost and with no change in incentive
constraints, and (ii) everything is identical in the two contracts from tK + 1 onwards. Hence,
the desired result.
I now show that µγ is increasing in γ to complete the proof of part (i). To see why,
suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a γ˜ such that µγ ′ < µγ˜ for some γ ′ > γ˜ . At
the prior µγ˜ ,
γ˜U hsep + (1− γ˜ )U lsep = γ˜U hhyb(µγ˜ )+ (1− γ˜ )U lhyb(µγ˜ )
where U θsep (U
θ
hyb) represents the optimal separating (hybrid) equilibrium payoff of type θ .
Note that U θhyb depends on the prior belief since the payoff of the optimal hybrid equilibrium is
strictly increasing in the prior, as I showed above. At the prior µγ ′ ,
γ ′U hsep + (1− γ ′)U lsep = γ ′U hhyb(µγ ′)+ (1− γ ′)U lhyb(µγ ′)
< γ ′U hhyb(µγ˜ )+ (1− γ ′)U lhyb(µγ˜ )
where the strict inequality follows because µγ ′ < µγ˜ . This implies that
(γ ′ − γ˜ )(U hsep −U lsep) < (γ ′ − γ˜ )(U hhyb(µγ˜ )−U lhyb(µγ˜ )).
and U hsep < U
h
hyb(µγ˜ ) since U
l
sep = sl−u¯1−δl and U lhyb(µγ˜ ) ≥ sl−u¯1−δl (the latter holds since if
U lhyb(µγ˜ ) <
sl−u¯
1−δl , then the hybrid equilibrium would be strictly dominated by a separating
equilibrium due to Claim 3). But if U hsep < U
h
hyb(µγ˜ ), then
γ˜U hsep + (1− γ˜ )U lsep < γ˜U hhyb(µγ˜ )+ (1− γ˜ )U lhyb(µγ˜ ),
a contradiction. Note that the steps above shows that if γ˜ is such that U lhyb(µγ˜ ) >
sl−u¯
1−δl , then it
must be the case that µγ ′ > µγ˜ for all γ ′ > γ˜ . Hence, µγ is strictly increasing at sufficiently
low levels of γ . This is because if γ is low enough, then U lhyb(µγ ) >
sl−u¯
1−δl must hold in the
optimal hybrid contract. To see why, suppose towards a contradiction that U lhyb(µγ ) = sl−u¯1−δl for
all γ ∈ (0, 1). By Claim 3, U lhyb(µγ ) = sl−u¯1−δl is possible only if ν0 = 0; that is, the low type
defaults with probability one at t = 0. Thus, b0 is such that b0µγ = bl so that U lhyb(µγ ) = sl−u¯1−δl
can hold. Moreover, b0 < bh since b0µγ = bl and µγ > blbh . Thus, b0 can be increased slightly
and make the low type better off. If γ is low enough (for example, lower than µγ
y′(eh)
c′(eh) ), then
U lhyb(µγ ) = sl−u¯1−δl cannot hold because the increase in the low type’s payoff due to a small
increase in b0 makes up for the decrease in the high type’s payoff (if there is a decrease at all).
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Next, I prove part (ii); i.e., if the optimal contract is hybrid, then bt , et and st are strictly
increasing (as long as bonus payments are honored) until they reach the symmetric information
benchmark, which takes place in finite time. To prove this, I will start with the last period in
which the bonus is different from bh just as in the proof of Proposition 6. So, let T = min{t ∈
N|bt = bh}. Note that bt = bh for all t ≥ T on the equilibrium path, otherwise the bonus
payment would not be enforceable with the low type. By Claim 2, T < ∞. If T = 0, then
b0 = bh and there is nothing to prove (indeed, if µ0 is sufficiently high and close to one, then
b0 = bh). So, assume that T > 0. If T > 1, then I will assume without loss of generality that
νt > 0 at every t < T − 1, and thus equilibrium belief µt < 1 for all t < T .2 By the definition
of T , bT−1 < bh must hold. Moreover, eT−1 < eT must hold. To see why, note that either
eT = eh or eT < eh . In the former case, it is immediate that eT−1 < eT . Next, assume that
eT < eh . Given that λT bh = c(eT ) < c(eh) in the optimal contract, it follows that λT < 1.
Thus, in equilibrium νT−1 > 0 and νT = 0. Rewriting eT = e(λT , bT ), it follows that
bT−1 + δl1− δl p¯i ≤ δlpil,T = δl
(
s(e(λT , bT ))− u¯ + λT bT + δl1− δl p¯i
)
.
As before, pil,t denotes the continuation payoff of a low type principal who has not defaulted
until period t (by an abuse of notation). If it were the case that eT−1 ≥ e(λT , bT ), then bT−1 ≥
λT bT would follow, and the inequality above would imply that λT bT ≤ bl , a contradiction by
Claims 3 and 4. Thus, eT−1 < eT . Next, I show that bT−2 < bT−1 assuming that T ≥ 2.
Suppose not, so that bT−2 ≥ bT−1. Since νT−2 > 0,
bT−1 ≤ bT−2 ≤ δlpil,T−1 − δl1− δl p¯i.
I now argue that bT−1 < δlpil,T − δl1−δl p¯i must hold if bT−2 ≥ bT−1. Otherwise, the inequality
above implies that pil,T−1 ≥ pil,T . But this cannot hold given that eT−1 < eT and that pil,T >
sT−u¯
1−δl (this latter holds because el < eT ). Thus, bT−1 < δlpil,T − δl1−δl p¯i . Yet, this gives rise to
another contradiction. Given this, bT−1 can be increased by a small  > 0 and the implemented
effort level can be modified in a way that c(e′T−1) = bT−1 + . This increases the payoff
of both types if νt = 1 for all t < T − 1. If there exists a t < T − 1 such that νt < 1,
then the incentive of the low type to default at t is distorted since pil,t+1 increases due to the
increase in surplus at T − 1; in particular, the low type strictly prefers paying the bonus at t
rather than defaulting. Note however that increasing bt by the amount of the increase in δlpil,t+1
(without changing the implemented effort level et ) leaves the low type’s continuation payoff
and strategy at t unaffected. The high type has a strictly higher continuation payoff due to
her higher discount factor. Moreover, given that the agent’s continuation payoff at t is strictly
higher with the increase in bt (there is no change in et ), the output requirement at t = 0 can be
increased by a small amount. Thus, both types are strictly better off, a contradiction. Hence, it
follows that bT−2 < bT−1 must hold. This in turn implies that eT−2 < eT−1. Suppose not so
2The claim is still true if νt= 0 at some t < T − 1, and thus, equilibrium beliefs are degenerate from
t + 1 onwards with probability 1—the proof of Proposition 6 can be directly applied for any t < T such
that µt= 1 in order to show that bτ< bτ+1 and eτ< eτ+1 for all τ ∈ {t, ..., T − 1}.
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that eT−2 ≥ eT−1, which in turn implies that λT−1 < 1 and that bT−2 ≥ λT−1bT−1. However,
since νT−2 > 0, the low type’s enforcement constraint (see above) combined with the inequality
bT−2 ≥ λT−1bT−1 implies that λT−1bT−1 ≤ bl , in contradiction with Claims 3 and 4. Thus,
eT−2 < eT−1. Next, assume that bt < bt+1 and et < et+1 for all t ∈ {τ, τ + 1, ..., T − 2} by the
induction hypothesis. I will show that bτ−1 < bτ and eτ−1 < eτ must hold. The proof of this
is very similar to the proof above for the claim that bT−2 < bT−1 and eT−2 < eT−1. Suppose
towards a contradiction that bτ−1 ≥ bτ . Since ντ−1 > 0,
bτ ≤ bτ−1 ≤ δlpil,τ − δl1− δl p¯i.
I will now argue that bτ < δlpil,τ+1− δl1−δl p¯i must hold. Otherwise, the inequality above implies
that pil,τ ≥ pil,τ+1. But this cannot hold given that bt and et are strictly increasing for all
t ∈ {τ, τ + 1, ..., T } and pil,T > sT−u¯1−δl . Thus, bτ < δlpil,τ+1 − δl1−δl p¯i . But this is also a
contradiction, similar to what I argued above; there is a modified hybrid contract which gives a
strictly higher payoff to both types. Thus, bτ−1 < bτ . To see why eτ−1 < eτ , suppose towards
a contradiction that eτ−1 ≥ eτ . This implies that λτ < 1 and that bτ−1 ≥ λτbτ . Since ντ−1 > 0
and ντ < 0, the low type’s enforcement constraint combined with the inequality bτ−1 ≥ λτbτ
and the fact that
pil,τ = s(e(λτ , bτ ))− u¯ + λτbτ + δl1− δl p¯i,
implies that λτbτ ≤ bl , in contradiction with Claims 3 and 4.
Finally, I establish the following claim regarding the assumptions A1 and A1′ and com-
plete the proof. Note that below I focus on hybrid equilibria in which the low type’s payoff is
higher than sl−u¯1−δl , which is without loss of generality because otherwise, Claim 3 implies that
the hybrid equilibrium is strictly dominated by a separating equilibrium. Note that this is true
regardless of the form of the punishment strategy as Claim 3 does not make any assumption
thereof. Thus, using Claim 3 enables me to obtain sharper results regarding the optimality of
A1.
CLAIM 6: Let b˜ be such that b˜ = c(e(b˜)) and y(e(b˜)) = y(el) − c(el), and consider hybrid
equilibria that give the low type an equilibrium payoff greater than sl−u¯1−δl . If y
′(eh)/c′(eh) is
sufficiently larger than 1 (for example, higher than bh
b˜
), then it is optimal to impose the worst
punishment after a default. The same is also true if δl and δh are not far from each other or if
µ0 is sufficiently high.
PROOF: Assume that pidθ,t+1 >
p¯i
1−δθ for some t ≥ 0 in the optimal hybrid contract, where
pidθ,t+1 is (as defined before) the punishment payoff of a type-θ principal who defaulted at t .
There are two types of periods to consider: the period in which the low type defaults with
probability one, and the periods in which the low type strictly randomizes between returning
and defaulting. I start by period T , the period in which the low type defaults with probability
one (that is, νT = 0 and νt > 0 for all t < T ). Note that at period T ,
bT + δhpidh,T+1 = δhpih,T+1,
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and
bT + δlpidl,T+1 ≥ δlpil,T+1,
where (as before) piθ,t+1 represents the payoff of a type-θ principal who has not defaulted until
t + 1. If it were the case that bT + δhpidh,T+1 < δhpih,T+1, then the punishment payoff pidθ,T+1
for defaulting in period T can be slightly increased to make the low type strictly better off with
no effect on the high type, a contradiction. Assume that bT is increased by a small amount
ε > 0, whereas δlpidl,T+1 is decreased by the same amount. It follows that δhpi
d
h,T+1 falls by
more than ε due to the fact that δh > δl , and thus the high type’s enforcement constraint is
satisfied. This change increases the payoff of the optimal hybrid equilibrium at T for both types
provided that µT
y′(eT )
c′(eT ) > 1. Moreover, µT (more generally, every λt ) is bounded below away
from zero (no matter how small µ0 might be) in every hybrid equilibrium such that the low
type’s payoff is at least sl−u¯1−δl . This is because e(µT , bT ) must be such that y(e(µT , bT )) =
y(e(b˜)) > y(el)− c(el) > 0 holds (otherwise, the low type’s payoff is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl ).
Thus, µT > b˜bh > 0. Since
y′(eT )
c′(eT ) >
y′(eh)
c′(eh) , if
y′(eh)
c′(eh) is sufficiently high, for example higher than
bh
b˜
, then the increase in bT surely increases the payoff of the optimal hybrid equilibrium at T .
Note that the increase in pil,T can affect the incentive of the low type to default before T if there
exists a t < T such that νt < 1. However, as I argued before, increasing bt by the amount of
the increase in δlpil,t+1 (without changing the implemented effort level et ) leaves the low type’s
continuation payoff and strategy at t unaffected. The high type has a strictly higher continuation
payoff due to her higher discount factor. Moreover, given that the agent’s continuation payoff
at t is strictly higher with the increase in bt (no change in et ), the output requirement at t = 0
can be increased by a small amount. Thus, both types are strictly better off, a contradiction.
Next, consider an arbitrary period t < T such that νt < 1 and pidθ,t+1 >
p¯i
1−δθ . Then,
bt + δlpidl,t+1 = δlpil,t+1 and bt + δhpidh,t+1 ≤ δhpih,t+1. Assume that bt is increased by a small
amount ε > 0 whereas δlpidl,t+1 is decreased by the same amount. It follows that the low type
is indifferent between paying bt + ε and defaulting. Moreover, the high type strictly prefers
paying bt + ε since the reduction in δhpidh,t+1 is larger than ε due to the fact that δh > δl . This
increase makes both types strictly better off if λt
y′(et )
c′(et ) > 1. This will be the case if for example
y′(eh)
c′(eh) is higher than
bh
b˜
. The proof of this claim is very similar to the proof above and therefore,
omitted.
Steps in the proof above already show that A1 is optimal if µ0 is sufficiently high. Next,
I show that it is optimal if δh and δl are sufficiently close. To show this I will argue that if δh and
δl are sufficiently close, then λt
y′(et )
c′(et ) > 1 at every t ≥ 0. Suppose towards a contradiction that
there exists a t such that λt
y′(et )
c′(et ) ≤ 1; that is, λt ≤ c
′(et )
y′(et ) < 1. Thus, λt is bounded above away
from 1 because c
′(et )
y′(et ) <
c′(eh)
y′(eh) < 1. Note that the following must hold so that the high type is
willing to honor the bonus promise bt .
bt ≤ δhpih,t+1 −
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−th (sτ − u¯),
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where pih,t+1 < sh−u¯1−δh if sτ − u¯ > p¯i for some τ > t . Moreover, it must be the case that if δh and
δl are sufficiently close, then
λtbt > y(e(λt , bt))− (y(el)− c(el)) ≥
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tl (sl − sτ ).
I start with the second inequality. If this inequality does not hold, then the low type’s payoff
is strictly lower than sl−u¯1−δl and the equilibrium is strictly dominated. The first inequality holds
because λt is bounded above away from one and therefore, there exists a  > 0 such that if
δh − δl < , then λtbt < bl . Hence, the first inequality follows. Thus, it follows that
λt
(
δhpih,t+1 −
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−th (sτ − u¯)
)
≥ λtbt >
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tl (sl − sτ ).
However, note that as δh and δl get closer and closer, it must be the case that
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tl (sl − sτ ) > λt
(
δhpih,t+1 −
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−th (sτ − u¯)
)
because λt is bounded away from 1, and sh and sl get closer as δh and δl get closer. Hence, it
follows that
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−t
l (sl − sτ ) > λtbt , a contradiction.
B Proofs of Claims in Section III
Assume that the two principal types, the high type and the low type differ in (and are privately-
informed regarding) their productivity and are identical in every other respect. Let yθ represent
the production function of type-θ principal, where θ ∈ {h, l} and yh(e) > yl(e). Suppose
that there exists a separating equilibrium {wt , bt}∞t=0 implementing et in period t ≥ 0. As
before, Cl = {wl, bl} (Ch = {wh, bh}) denotes the optimal symmetric-information contract of
type-l (type-h) principal, which implements el (eh) in every period. First, note that the optimal
separating contract is such that a low type principal who imitates the high type strictly prefers
defaulting at some t ≥ 0 because otherwise the separating contract {wt , bt}∞t=0 is one that can be
implemented with the low type in a symmetric-information setting and thus, either {wt , bt}∞t=0
is such that {wt , bt} = Cl for every t , which is a contradiction, or the imitation payoff of the
low type from {wt , bt}∞t=0 is strictly lower than yl(el)−wl−bl1−δ ; this is also a contradiction because
then {wt , bt}∞t=0 can be strictly improved upon. In particular, there exists a large enough but
finite T such that if the high type starts offering Ch from T onwards, then the imitation payoff
of the low type increases by a very small amount—i.e., the imitation payoff is still lower than
yl(el)−wl−bl
1−δ , and thus, the low type strictly prefers revealing her type and offering Cl (notice that
the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5). As a result, the high type is strictly better off,
a contradiction. Thus, a low type principal who imitates the high type strictly prefers defaulting
at some finite t ≥ 0. This in turn implies that the high type starts offering Ch in finite time.
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Thus, there exists a T < ∞ such that the high type offers Ch from T onwards in the optimal
separating equilibrium. It follows that
yl(el)− wl − bl
1− δ ≥
T−1∑
t=0
δt(yl(et)− wt − bt)+ δT
(
yl(eh)− wh + δ p¯i1− δ
)
is a necessary condition as one of the incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that
the low type is deterred from imitation. Adding and subtracting bh and using the enforcement
constraint of the high type (i.e., bh = δ1−δ (sh(eh)− u¯ − p¯i)), it follows that
yl(el)− wl − bl
1− δ ≥
T−1∑
t=0
δt(yl(et)− wt − bt)+ δT (yl(eh)− wh − bh)+ δT+1 sh(eh)− u¯1− δ
must hold. For the high type to prefer separating, the following must hold.
T−1∑
t=0
δt(yh(et)− wt − bt)+ δT (yh(eh)− wh − bh)+ δT+1 sh(eh)− u¯1− δ ≥
yh(el)− wl − bl
1− δ .
These inequalities imply that
T−1∑
t=0
δt(yh(et)− yl(et))+ δT (yh(eh)− yl(eh)) ≥ yh(el)− yl(el)1− δ .
First, observe that this inequality can never hold if yh(e) − yl(e) = η for every e because
T is a finite number, as I explained above. Thus, there exists no separating equilibrium if
yh(e)− yl(e) = η for every e.
Next, consider the case where yh(e) > yl(e) and yh(e) − yl(e) is increasing in e. Let
κ > 0 be such that
yh(el)− yl(el)
1− δ <
yh(eh)− yl(eh)
1− δ ≤
yh(el)− yl(el)
1− δ + κ.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a separating equilibrium regardless of κ > 0.
It follows that, for every κ > 0,
T−1∑
t=0
δt(yh(et)− yl(et))+ δT (yh(eh)− yl(eh)) ≥ yh(el)− yl(el)1− δ ≥
yh(eh)− yl(eh)
1− δ − κ.
But yh(et) − yl(et) < yh(eh) − yl(eh) for every et such that t < T (because et < eh and
yh(e) − yl(e) is increasing in e). Thus, the inequality above cannot hold for every κ > 0, a
contradiction. Notice that in the proof above I assumed that T is uniformly bounded for all
κ > 0 (which may be partly justified since T is finite in the optimal separating equilibrium for
fixed yl and yh). What if limκ→0 T (κ) = ∞, where T (κ) = min{t ≥ 0|Ct = Ch given κ > 0}
in the optimal separating contract? I am able to rule this out and show that limκ→0 T (κ) < ∞
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if there is a possibly large but finite number of effort levels, as I discuss in more detail below.
However, showing the same with a continuum of effort levels is very difficult. Nevertheless, I
am confident that it is impossible to construct a separating equilibrium even if limκ→0 T (κ) =
∞ since both sides of the inequality below
T (κ)−1∑
t=0
δt [(yh(et)− yl(et))− (yh(el)− yl(el))] ≥ δT (κ)
(
yh(el)− yl(el)
1− δ − (yh(eh)− yl(eh))
)
converge to zero as κ → ∞, and yet it is impossible to make sure that the right-hand side
converges to zero faster than the left-hand side because not only (yh(et) − yl(et)) − (yh(el) −
yl(el)) converges to zero as κ → 0 but also for fixed t ≥ 0, lim supκ→0 eκt ≤ el holds, which
increases the convergence rate of the left-hand side (lim supκ→0 eκt ≤ el must hold for every
t ≥ 0 if limκ→0 T (κ) = ∞; otherwise, I can show that T (κ) is uniformly bounded above by
some T¯ < ∞). These issues do not arise if there is a large but finite number of effort levels;
in that case, I can show that T is uniformly bounded above for all κ > 0 (assuming that a
separating equilibrium exists). Thus, I can also show that separation is not generally possible
even if yh(e) > yl(e) and yh(e) − yl(e) is increasing in e. However, there always exists a
separating equilibrium if types differ in their time preferences, and this is still true with discrete
effort levels (the proof of Proposition 3 does not rely on the existence of a continuum of effort
levels).
C Dynamic Intuitive Criterion (DIC)
In this part, I will provide a detailed discussion of DIC, and I will explain how hybrid contracts
can be eliminated using DIC. Let Ct = {wt , bt} describe the period-t hybrid equilibrium con-
tract that promises to pay bt and implements et . Fix an arbitrary hybrid equilibrium {Ct}∞t=0.
Assume that information revelation is complete with probability one at the end of period T .
To be more precise, let T = min{t ≥ 0|νt = 0}. Thus, if the low type principal honored all
the promised payments up until period T , then λT = µT < 1 and µT+1 ∈ {0, 1}. Assume
that T > 0 for now. For simplicity, I focus on equilibria where the high type offers Ch from
T + 1 onwards; i.e., {Ct}∞t=T+1 = {Ch,Ch, ...}.3 Let CT−1 = {wT−1, bT−1}, where eT−1 is the
equilibrium effort level. Consider the deviation {Dt}t≥T−1 such that (i)-(iii) hold:
(i) DT−1 = {w′T−1, bT−1}, where bT−1 is contingent on eT−1 (thus, bT−1 and eT−1 in DT−1
are the same as in contract CT−1),
w′T−1 = wT−1 +1
δl + δh
2
,
and the term 1 is derived as follows. Let 1 = y(e′T )− y(eT ) > 0, where eT is the effort level
implemented by CT = {wT , bT }, and e′T is described below in part (ii).
3In a hybrid equilibrium in which either T = ∞ or T <∞ but behavior distortion of the high type
continues after beliefs have become degenerate, one can still find a deviation path that would make the
high type strictly better off and the low type worse off using arguments similar to those presented below.
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(ii) If the offer DT−1 is accepted, and the agent exerts effort eT−1, then DT = {wT , bT } is
offered. Thus, wT and bT are the same as in the equilibrium hybrid contract CT , but, unlike
in CT , the bonus payment bT rewards y(e′T ), where e′T is the highest possible effort level that
satisfies both c(e) ≤ bT and wT + bT − c(e) ≥ u¯. Given this, e′T > eT must hold (assuming
for the moment that the agent believes that only the high type principal deviates to {Dt}t≥T−1)
because µT < 1 and {Ct}∞t=T+1 = {Ch,Ch, ...}, whereas if only the high type principal deviates
to {Dt}t≥T−1 then DT and bT will be honored with probability one.4.
(iii) {Dt}t≥T+1 = {Ch,Ch, ...}. That is, if the agent accepts the offer DT , and exerts effort e′T ,
then the principal offers Ch from t = T + 1 onwards just as in the original hybrid contract
{Ct}∞t=0. Note that if the agent believes that the deviation {Dt}t≥T−1 comes from a high type,
then eT−1 and e′T are incentive compatible.
It is easy to show that the deviation {Dt}t≥T−1 is equilibrium-dominated for the low
type even if the agent chooses eT−1 and e′T . To see why, note that at T − 1,
pil,T−1 = yT−1 − wT−1 − bT−1 +max{bT−1 + δlpidl,T , δlpil,T }
given {Ct}∞t=0, where pidl,T represents the equilibrium punishment payoff for the low type after
defaulting at period T − 1. However, the deviation to {Dt}t≥T−1 gives the low type a maximum
possible payoff of
yT−1 − w′T−1 − bT−1 +max{bT−1 + δlpidl,T , δl(pi il,T +1)},
which is strictly lower than pil,T−1 (yT−1, bT−1 and eT−1 are the same across CT−1 and DT−1
whereas w′T−1 > wT−1 + δl1 by construction). Moreover, {Dt}t≥T−1 is enforceable for the
high type at every t ≥ T − 1, and since
yT−1−w′T−1− bT−1+ δh(yT +1−wT − bT ) > yT−1−wT−1− bT−1+ δh (yT − wT − bT )
holds, the high type is strictly better off—assuming that the agent believes that the bonus will be
honored with probability one at every t ≥ T − 1. Thus, it is always possible to find a deviation
path such that a hybrid equilibrium {Ct}∞t=0 is not robust to DIC provided that T > 0 in {Ct}∞t=0.
What happens if T = 0 so that µ1 ∈ {0, 1}? In that case, it is possible to rule out every hybrid
equilibrium as being unreasonable unless b0 in C0 is such that
b0 = δl
(
sh − u¯ + bh + δl1− δl p¯i
)
holds.5 Note that such a hybrid equilibrium is undominated by a separating equilibrium only
if µ0 > blb0 , which is a more stringent condition than µ0 >
bl
bh
as b0 < bh . Thus, such an
4I assume that bT> 0 without loss of generality. Otherwise, I set b′T= , and c(e′T )=  for small  > 0,
and 1 = y(e′T ) in the deviation contract.
5Note that since T = 0,
b0 ≥ δl
(
sh − u¯ + bh + δl1− δl p¯i
)
must hold. If this holds with strict inequality, then the deviation contract D0 = {w′0, b′0} and{Dt }t≥1= {Ch,Ch, ...} where b′0 = b0µ0 and w′0 = w0 + (1 − b0µ0)− does the job provided that  > 0
is small enough.
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equilibrium is not robust to DIC if µ0 ≤ blb0 . If µ0 > blb0 , then whether or not this is a reasonable
equilibrium depends on the precise parameters of the game as well as the cost and the production
functions.
Now, I provide a discussion of the Dynamic Intuitive Criterion. Unlike the case with the
standard Intuitive Criterion, which is typically applied to one-shot games, one concern is that
when a deviation contract is observed in some period, the complete path of deviation {Dt}t≥k
is not yet fully observed (although {Dt}t≥k is announced by the principal, this is only cheap
talk with the exception of the fixed wage in Dk). So, what should the agent infer from a single
deviation Dk when {Dt}t≥k is not yet fully observable? Note that the type of the principal does
not enter the payoff function of the agent directly. What matters for the agent is only λt , the
probability with which a payment promise is fulfilled; the type of the principal matters only
indirectly and due to its implication regarding the probability, λt . I explore the inference on this
probability given a deviation, which I denote by λˆt .
Assume that the principal deviates for the first time at an arbitrary period k ≥ 0. For
simplicity of the argument below, I focus on deviation contracts {Dt}t≥k such that c(e′t) ≤ b′t
and w′t + b′t − c(e′t) ≥ u¯ hold at every t ≥ k.6 Otherwise, I assume that the agent rejects Dt .
Second, a prerequisite for {Dt}t≥k to come from a high type principal is that every contract Dt
in {Dt}t≥k is enforceable for the high type.
The inference of the agent following a deviation at k is determined based on the equi-
librium dominance concept as follows: Does a low type principal benefit (relative to her equi-
librium payoff from {Ct}∞t=0) from offering Dk = {w′k, b′k}, paying w′k to the agent, obtaining
output y(e′k) and then defaulting on b′k? If the answer to this question Q
k
k is no, then the agent
infers that λˆk = 1, accepts the offer, and chooses his effort level in accordance with Dk . If b′k is
honored and Dk+1 is offered at k+ 1, then the agent asks the question Qkk+1: Does the low type
benefit from offering Dk+1 at k+1, payingw′k+1 to the agent, obtaining output y(e′k+1) and then
refusing to pay b′k+1, having offered and honored Dk? If the answer is again no, then the agent
infers that λˆk+1 = 1, accepts the offer, and chooses his effort level accordingly. Inductively,
let Qkt stand for the following question: Does the low type benefit from offering Dt at t > k,
paying w′t , obtaining output y(e′t) and then defaulting on b′t having offered and honored Dk ,
Dk+1,..., Dt−1? If the answer is again no, then the agent accepts the offer, infers that λˆt = 1
and chooses his effort level accordingly.
Let’s fix an arbitrary equilibrium {Ct}∞t=0. If there exists no k ≥ 0 and {Dt}t≥k such that
(i) the answer to question Qkt results in inferring λˆt = 1 for every t ∈ {k, k + 1, ...} (which
ensures that the low type cannot benefit from the deviation path at any t ≥ k); and
(ii) the high type is strictly better off with {Dt = {w′t , b′t , 1, e′t}}t≥k where effort e′t is incentive
compatible and b′t is enforceable at every t ∈ {k, k + 1, ...};
then equilibrium {Et}∞t=0 is “reasonable”. Otherwise, it is not reasonable. But these conditions
are equivalent to the definition of DIC given in the main text.
6Thus, it can easily be checked whether the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints are satisfied in the deviation contract.
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D Proofs of Claims in Section VI.A
I start the analysis with the case in which type-g is more able and has a lower cost of effort than
type-b in a way that cbH − cgH ≤ cbM − cgM , where cie denotes the cost of effort e ∈ {M, H}
for type-i seller, i ∈ {g, b}. As stated in the main text, I focus on the nontrivial case in which
type-g has an incentive to separate himself from type-b (equivalently, type-b has an incentive to
imitate type-g). This would be true if for example type-g can be induced to exert high effort in
a symmetric-information setting with relational incentives whereas type-b can only be induced
to exert medium effort (thus, type-g is similar to the high type principal and type-b is similar to
the low type principal in the main model). From now on, I will focus on such parameter values.
With a type-g seller, this translates to the following enforcement constraints in a symmetric-
information setting:
pH + δ1− δ p¯i ≤
8pH + (1−8)pM − cgH
1− δ ,
and
pH − cH + δ1− δ p¯i ≤ pM − cH + δ
8pH + (1−8)pM − cgH
1− δ ,
where pM and pH denote the equilibrium product price set given q = qM and q = qH , re-
spectively. I follow the literature in assuming that prices will be bid up to the respective buyer
valuations given their beliefs.7 It follows that pM = uM and pH = u H given that a seller is
“truthful” in his quality announcement. I also follow the literature in assuming that if the seller
trades with short-lived buyers, then past quality realizations of a seller are perfectly observable
(although they are not verifiable). The term p¯i denotes the per period punishment payoff of the
seller if the seller is dishonest in his message regarding quality. Given these, the first constraint
implies that the type-g seller does not benefit from exerting low effort, falsely claiming that
q = qH and selling a low-quality product at a rip-off price, pH . The second constraint implies
that the seller does not benefit from exerting high effort and falsely claiming that q = qH when
in fact q = qM . A reasonable assumption regarding the punishment payoff is that p¯i = uL .
Buyers who observe the dishonesty of a seller believe that the dishonest seller will always exert
low effort from then onwards and hence they will not pay more than uL for his product. For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, I assume that p¯i = uL = 0 from now on. Assuming
that p¯i = uL = 0 and that type-b seller can be induced to exert medium effort, the following
must hold:
pM ≤ δ8pM − c
b
M
1− δ .
This constraint implies that type-b seller will not benefit from (i) exerting low effort and falsely
claiming that q = qM , and (ii) exerting medium effort and falsely claiming that q = qM when
in fact q = qL . Since type-b seller cannot be motivated to exert high effort, either
pH >
8pH + (1−8)pM − cbH
1− δ ,
7This may be because buyers engage in Bertrand competition or the seller runs an auction. See Tadelis
(1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Jullien and Park (2014).
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or
pH − cH > pM − cH + δ8pH + (1−8)pM − c
b
H
1− δ ,
or both will hold. I assume that cbH is high enough so that the first inequality holds; hence,
pH >
8pH + (1−8)pM − cbH
1− δ . (2)
If these conditions above about type-b and type-g sellers are satisfied, then type-b seller can be
motivated to exert medium effort—but not high effort—and type-g seller can be motivated to
exert both high effort and medium effort in a symmetric-information setting.8
Now, consider the private-information setting. I first show that there is no separating
equilibrium if cbH − cgH ≤ cbM − cgM . Intuitively, comparing the benefit of separation for the high
type to the benefit of imitation for the low type is enough to see that there can be no separation.
The benefit of separation for the high type is equal to 8(pH−pM )+(1−8)pM−(c
g
H−cgM )
1−δ , whereas the
benefit of imitation for the low type is
max
{
pH ,
pH − cbH
1−8δ
}
− 8pM − c
b
M
1− δ ,
which is strictly greater than 8(pH−pM )+(1−8)pM−(c
g
H−cgM )
1−δ due to (2). The cost of advertising
(or of another type of money burning) is however the same for both types. Notice that this
argument can still hold even if cbH − cgH > cbM − cgM . Thus, the condition cbH − cgH > cbM − cgM
is also not sufficient for separation.
Formally, let at denote the cost of advertising in period t ≥ 0—I assume that at is
undertaken at the beginning of period t ≥ 0 before trade. I will first show that it is never
possible to find a sequence {at}∞t=0 that separates the two types if cbH − cgH ≤ cbM − cgM . In a
separating contract, the high type is willing to separate himself (rather than pooling with type-b)
as long as
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
E(pt |et)− cget − at
) ≥ 8pM − cgM
1− δ
where E(pt |et) and cget denote the “truthful” expected equilibrium price and cost given equilib-
rium effort et in period t , respectively. Note that this implies that
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
E(pt |et)− cbet − at
) ≥ 8pM − cbM
1− δ
since cbH − cgH ≤ cbM − cgM . I will now show that this inequality must be strict, which will imply
that the low type cannot be deterred from imitation and thus separation is impossible. Given that
8It is straightforward to verify that there exist parameter values cbM , c
b
H , pH , pM and 9 such that all of
the conditions are satisfied.
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seller types are “truthful” in their quality announcement, prices will be bid up to the respective
buyer valuations given their beliefs, and thus, pt ∈ {pL , pM , pH } in every t ≥ 0. Thus, in the
separating contract pt = pL if the seller announces q = qL , pt = pM if the seller announces
q = qM , and pt = pH if the seller announces q = qH .9 To see why the inequality above is
strict, assume that at > 0 for at least one t ≥ 0; otherwise, there is no costly signaling and
type-g seller cannot separate. Given this, there must exist a period T <∞ such that eT = H is
prescribed in the separating contract (otherwise, costly advertising is wasteful and type-g would
prefer imitating a type-b seller). In period T , type-b seller who imitates a type-g seller can cheat
by, for example, exerting low effort and announcing that q = qH . Thus, the payoff of a type-b
seller who imitates a type-g seller is (weakly) greater than
T−1∑
t=0
δt
(
E(pt |et)− cbet − at
)+ pH − aT .
But pH − aT is strictly greater than
∞∑
t=T
δt−T
(
E(pt |et)− cbet − at
)
because E(pt |et) is, by definition, the truthful expected equilibrium price and thus,
∞∑
t=T
δt−T ×(
E(pt |et)− cbet − at
)
is weakly smaller than 8pH+(1−8)pM−c
b
H
1−δ −
∞∑
t=T
at , which in turn is strictly
smaller than pH−aT due to (2). Hence, separation is not possible. Next, I show that cbH−cgH >
cbM − cgM is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium. To see why,
assume that pH is either equal or close to
8pH+(1−8)pM−cgH
1−δ . Steps similar to those above
show that in that case a separating equilibrium does not exist (simply note that delaying high-
effort/high-quality production is not less costly to the type-g seller, thus delay is not an effective
signaling tool). Hence, the condition cbH − cgH > cbM − cgM is not sufficient. A similar analysis
shows that separation is not generally possible in the case where the two types differ in 8 such
that 8g > 8b. The formal proof of this claim follows very similar steps to those above in the
case with differential effort costs and is available upon request.
If the two types differ in their discount factors, then there always exists a separating
equilibrium. The construction in the proof of Proposition 3 can be directly applied to show
that there exists a separating equilibrium. Let δi represent the discount factor of a type-i seller,
where i ∈ {g, b} and δg > δb. Let T ≥ 0 be the smallest integer t ≥ 0 such that
δtg
(
8(pH − pM)+ (1−8)pM − (cH − cM)
1− δg
)
> δtb
(
max
{
pH ,
pH − cH
1−8δb
}
− 8pM − cM
1− δb
)
9Of course, the separating contract must be enforceable for the high type; i.e., the quality announce-
ment must be truthful. However, these constraints are not needed for the result.
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holds. Since δg > δb, it follows that T <∞. Set a0 (advertising at t = 0) equal to
a0 = δtb
(
max{pH , pH − cH1−8δb } −
8pM − cM
1− δb
)
,
and at = 0 for all t > 0. Then, the separating equilibrium is as follows. Type-g seller chooses
advertising at t = 0 equal to a0 and exerts medium effort (et = M) at every t < T . From period
T onwards, the type-g seller exerts high effort—i.e., et = H at every t ≥ T . Type-b seller
chooses zero advertising and exerts medium effort (et = M) at every t ≥ 0. Finally, quality
announcement is truthful in every period with both types of sellers. This simple construction
separates the two types.
The main result also extends to a market setting where sellers enter and exit the econ-
omy stochastically, and names can be traded, as modeled in Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2001). In addition to the trading of names, I allow for name changes; for example,
an existing type-b firm with a bad reputation can try to erase the public memory about his type
by choosing a new name. I also maintain the assumption in Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2001) that changes in names’ ownership are unobservable.
Under these assumptions a separating equilibrium still exists, provided that type-g sell-
ers have a sufficiently high discount factor.10 To show why this is the case, I first spell out the
assumptions of this model. As in Tadelis (1999), I assume that there is a continuum of sellers
and buyers. Sellers enter and exit the economy in a way that the size of the seller population and
the distribution of seller types are constant over time. In each period, a seller exits the market
with probability 1−φ and the measure of sellers that exit the market is replaced by an identical
measure of new sellers that enter the market. I assume that as a firm with a good name exits the
market, the firm sells its name to another firm. The name of a firm that has cheated once (by a
deceptive message regarding product quality) is worthless as it signals a bad type. I also assume
that a small proportion ζ > 0 of entrants cannot buy a name (this is a reduced-form assumption
which illustrates the case where some new firms are credit-constrained and therefore unable to
purchase an established name).
Good names will be scarce in my construction since good names will be owned only by
type-g firms but everyone wants a good name. As a result, the price of a good name will be bid
up to a point where the highest bidder is indifferent between buying the name and not buying
it. The construction will be such that the highest bidders are new type-g firms, and hence good
names are bought only by good types. Note that a new type-g firm who cannot buy a name
(because ζ > 0) may build its name by advertising. I assume that an already-established, good
name has an infinitesimal advantage over building up a new name. For example, new advertising
campaigns might have the risk of being unpopular or unable to reach prospective buyers (with
an infinitesimal probability) whereas an existing name is already established. As a result, a new
type-g firm prefers obtaining an already existing good name over building up a new name. If
the new firm buys a name, then it will spend an amount ps on this name, which is discussed in
more detail below. As before, the benefit of imitation for a type-b seller is max
{
pH ,
pH−cH
1−8φδl
}
−
10In particular, there exists a separating equilibrium such that good names are bought only by good
sellers because they are too expensive for bad sellers.
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8pM−cM
1−φδl , whereas the benefit of separation for a type-g seller is
8(pH−pM )+(1−8)pM−(cH−cM )
1−φδh .
Given ps , the sale price of a good name, the “net” benefit of separation for a type-g firm is
8(pH − pM)+ (1−8)pM − (cH − cM)
1− φδh − ps +
δh(1− φ)
1− φδh ps,
where the last term follows because the firm can resell its name to a new firm upon exiting the
market. This in turn implies that the “net” benefit of separation for a type-g firm is positive
provided that the following holds:
ps ≤ 8(pH − pM)+ (1−8)pM − (cH − cM)1− δh .
Next, note that ps must be such that ps ≥ max
{
pH ,
pH−cH
1−8φδl
}
so that a type-b firm is deterred
from buying a good name. Thus, as long as δh is sufficiently high, a separating equilibrium
exists because there exists a ps that satisfies both constraints.11 This in turn implies that a good
name will not go bad because it will be too expensive for type-b sellers.
E Proof of Proposition 9
First, note that Lemma 5 also holds in the setting with stochastic output and unobservable effort.
In fact, behavior distortion must be over at a finite T in the “constrained” optimal contract, as
well. Suppose not. Then, there are two possibilities. Either b∗t is bounded above away from
bh , or b∗t (or a subsequence) converges to bh , where b∗t denotes the bonus at t in the optimal
contract. If b∗t is bounded above away from bh , then the proof of Lemma 5 applies directly
to show that this is a contradiction, and that costly signaling must end at a finite time. Next,
consider the case in which b∗t (or a subsequence, which I also denote by b∗t ) converges to bh .
Note that for all t sufficiently large,
b∗t = δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i
must hold. If t is large, and
b∗t < δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i
then the high type can make a gainful increase in bt , which increases her payoff by more than
the imitation payoff of the low type. To see why, first note that
b∗t > δlpi il,t+1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i,
for all sufficiently large t . This is because b∗t → bh , and
bh > δl Vl − δl1− δl p¯i.
11The cost of advertising for new type-g firms that are unable to buy a name is equal to ps .
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As a result, at a sufficiently large t , the low type will have defaulted with a very high probability
(one high output realization suffices), which reduces drastically the impact of an increase in bt
on the imitation payoff of the low type. Thus,
b∗t = δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i
for all sufficiently large t . Since pih,t+1 = (st+1 − u) + b∗t+1 + δh1−δh p¯i , b∗t < b∗t+1 must hold
for every sufficiently large t . Otherwise, b∗t ≥ b∗t+1 implies that pih,t+1 ≥ pih,t+2 and that
b∗t+1 ≥ b∗t+2 for every sufficiently large t . But this is a contradiction given the initial hypothesis
that b∗t converges to bh . Since b∗t < b∗t+1, it follows that
pi il,t+1 >
(st − u¯)+ et
(
b∗t + δl1−δl p¯i
)
1− δl(1− et) .
As a result,
Vl − pi il,t+1 <
(sh − u¯)+ eh
(
b∗h + δl1−δl p¯i
)
1− δl(1− eh) −
(st − u¯)+ et
(
b∗t + δl1−δl p¯i
)
1− δl(1− et)
<
(
sh + eh
(
b∗h + δl1−δl p¯i
))
−
(
st + et
(
b∗t + δl1−δl p¯i
))
1− δl ,
where the last inequality uses the fact that eh > et . Moreover, sh1−δh − pih,t+1 =
bh−b∗t
δh
. Thus,
lim
t→∞
(Vl − pi il,t+1)
bh−b∗t
δh
≤ lim
bh→b∗t
δh
[(
sh + eh
(
b∗h + δl1−δl p¯i
))
−
(
st + et
(
b∗t + δl1−δl p¯i
))]
(1− δl)
(
bh − b∗t
) ∈ (0,∞)
by L’Hopital’s rule because st and et can be written as a function of bt . Using this finding, the
fact that δl < δh and the fact that the low type will have already defaulted with a very high
probability at large t , one can see that the benefit of high type from proposing Ch at sufficiently
large t must be higher than the increase in the imitation of the low type.12 Thus, there is a
modified separating contract that makes the high type strictly better off, a contradiction.
Next, I prove the statement about the gradually increasing pattern of b∗t . After the initial
period the only costly signaling device is the offer of a sufficiently low bonus (costly signaling
in the form of a high fixed wage can be used only in the initial period since ut = u¯1−δ must hold
for all t ≥ 1 in the constrained optimal contract). I start with the final period of costly signaling.
Let T − 1 denote the last period such that b∗t 6= bh . Thus, b∗t = bh for all t ≥ T . First, note
that b∗T−1 < bT = bh by the definition of T . Otherwise, b∗T−1 > bT in which case the high
type principal defaults (recall that b∗T−1 6= bh by hypothesis). Next, I show that b∗T−2 < b∗T−1.
Suppose towards a contradiction that b∗T−2 ≥ b∗T−1. Since b∗T−1 < bT = bh it follows that
pi il,T−1 < pi
i
l,T = Vl .
12The agent’s incentives are not affected since Lemma 4 holds in this setting.
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There are two cases to consider:
(i) First, assume that
b∗T−2 ≤ δlpi il,T−1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
Since pi il,T−1 < pi
i
l,T it follows that
b∗T−1 ≤ b∗T−2 < δlpi il,T −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
However,
b∗T−1 < δlpi
i
l,T −
δl
1− δl p¯i
cannot hold in the optimal contract, just as I argued in the proof of Proposition 6. Thus, b∗T−1 >
b∗T−2, a contradiction.
(ii) Next, assume that
b∗T−2 > δlpi
i
l,T−1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
Assume towards a contradiction that b∗T−2 ≥ b∗T−1. Consider the modified contract: b∗T−2 is
decreased slightly whereas b∗T−1 is increased in a way that
∂pi il,0
∂bT−2
|bT−2=b∗T−2 +
∂pi il,0
∂bT−1
|bT−1=b∗T−1
∂bT−1
∂bT−2
= 0 (3)
holds. Note that a small increase in b∗T−1 is enforceable for the high type since the surplus is
always sh after T − 1, and b∗T−1 < bh . Next, I show that
∂pih
∂bT−2
|bT−2=b∗T−2 +
∂pih
∂bT−1
|bT−1=b∗T−1
∂bT−1
∂bT−2
< 0. (4)
This will establish a contradiction as it implies that the high type principal can decrease b∗T−2
and increase b∗T−1 slightly, increasing her payoff and keeping the imitation payoff of the low
type same. From (3) and the fact that
b∗T−1 ≥ δlpi il,T −
δl
1− δl p¯i,
it follows that
∂bT−1
∂bT−2
= −
∂pi il,0
∂bT−2 |bT−2=b∗T−2
∂pi il,0
∂bT−1 |bT−1=b∗T−1
= −
∂sT−2
∂bT−2 + e∗T−2 +
(
bT−2 + δl1−δl p¯i
)
∂e
∂bT−2 − δlpil,T−1 ∂e∂bT−2
δl(1− e∗T−2)
[
∂sT−1
∂bT−1 + e∗T−1 +
(
bT−1 + δl1−δl p¯i
)
∂e
∂bT−1 − δlpil,T ∂e∂bT−1
]
= −
c′′(e∗T−1)
[
(H − L − c′(e∗T−2))+ e∗T−2c′′(e∗T−2)+ bT−2 + δl1−δl p¯i − δlpil,T−1
]
δlc′′(e∗T−2)(1− e∗T−2)
[
(H − L − c′(e∗T−1))+ e∗T−1c′′(e∗T−1)+ bT−1 + δl1−δl p¯i − δlpil,T
]
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Moreover,
−
∂pih
∂bT−2 |bT−2=b∗T−2
∂pih
∂bT−1 |bT−1=b∗T−1
= − (H − L − c
′(e∗T−2))c′′(e
∗
T−1)
δh(H − L − c′(e∗T−1))c′′(e∗T−2)
.
By the assumption that ec′′(e) is weakly increasing, (4) must hold. Thus, b∗T−2 ≥ b∗T−1 cannot
hold in the optimal contract. Hence, b∗T−2 < b
∗
T−1.
Next, I show that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}, b∗t−1 < b∗t must hold provided that bτ is
strictly increasing for all T ≥ τ ≥ t . The proof of this is very similar to the proof above for
the claim that b∗T−2 < b
∗
T−1. First, one needs to verify that pi
i
l,τ < pi
i
l,τ+1 and pih,τ < pih,τ+1
for all T − 1 ≥ τ ≥ t .13 But, this is true due to the hypothesis that bτ is monotone increasing
for τ ≥ t and due to the fact that continuation payoffs are not used to motivate the agent. First,
consider the case in which
b∗t−1 ≤ δlpi il,t −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
Assume towards a contradiction that b∗t−1 ≥ b∗t . From
b∗t ≤ b∗t−1 ≤ δlpi il,t −
δl
1− δl p¯i < δlpi
i
l,t+1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i,
it follows that
b∗t < δlpi il,t+1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
But this implies that
b∗t = δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i.
Otherwise, the high type could increase b∗t (and the initial fixed wage) slightly and make a
positive gain. But then,
b∗t = δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i > δhpih,t −
δh
1− δh p¯i ≥ b
∗
t−1
implies that b∗t−1 < b∗t , a contradiction. Next, consider the case where
b∗t−1 > δlpi
i
l,t −
δl
1− δl p¯i.
Assume towards a contradiction that b∗t−1 ≥ b∗t . This implies that
b∗t ≤ b∗t−1 ≤ δlpih,t −
δh
1− δh p¯i < δhpih,t+1 −
δh
1− δh p¯i.
The last inequality implies that a small increase in b∗t is enforceable for the high type. Also, it
implies that
b∗t ≥ δlpi il,t+1 −
δl
1− δl p¯i,
13This is true for t = T − 1, as I already argued. Then, the result follows by induction.
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otherwise the high type can make a gainful increase in b∗t . Now, let the contract change as
follows: b∗t−1 is decreased and b∗t is increased slightly such that
∂pi il,0
∂bt−1
|bt−1=b∗t−1 +
∂pi il,0
∂bt
|bt=b∗t−1
∂bt
∂bt−1
= 0
holds. But this implies that
∂pih
∂bt−1
|bt−1=b∗t−1 +
∂pih
∂bt
|bt=b∗t
∂bt
∂bt−1
< 0,
resulting in a contradiction. The proof for showing this follows steps that are very similar to
those I used to prove the claim that b∗T−2 < b
∗
T−1. Therefore, it is omitted.
In the (constrained) optimal contract, ut = u¯1−δ for t ≥ 1 as I already discussed. More-
over, u0 ≥ u¯1−δ . As a result, wt is strictly decreasing as long as bt is strictly increasing.
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